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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

COUNTRY China

SUBJECT Political Information: The San Min Chu I Youth Corps

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note: The San Min Chu I Youth Corps, organized from five of the bureaus of the original Blue Shirts Society under CC Clique domination, has been the tool of the CC Clique for eight years. The Corps was reorganized in September 1946, at which time CH'EN Ch'eng and the Whampoa Clique achieved control. CHIANG Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo's son, is now the Chief of the all-important Department of Organization and Training. The CC Clique has definitely been beaten in the reorganization. Blue Shirt activity of the Corps is no longer emphasized and the major function of the members is propaganda work. Anti-Communist and pro-Kuomintang feeling is still the prime requisite for membership in the Corps.)

I. ORIGIN AND GROWTH

- The following paragraph is a summary of a section of a document entitled Lan Yi She Nei Mu (藍衣社內幕) written by CH'EN Kung-shu (陳恭澍) and published in Shanghai in April 1942. The fact presented here have been confirmed by seven of the sources mentioned above. CH'EN Kung-shu was a TAI Li man who later joined WANG Ching-wei's puppet regime; under WANG's influence and pressure, CH'EN recorded the secrets of the Blue Shirts.

"After the Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931, FENG Tai (鄧惕), a graduate of the first class of the Whampoa Military Academy, suggested to the Generalissimo to have the young military men of China organize the Chiu Wang She (救亡社). His proposal was not accepted. Later LIU Chien-ch'un (劉健群), secretary to General HO Ying-ch'iu (何應欽), proposed the organization of the Blue Shirts or Lan Yi She (藍衣社), an organization similar to the Chiu Wang She. Because LIU was a scholar and a man of no important position his proposal was also rejected. Around the time of the January 28th Incident (1932) HO Chung-han (賀衷寒), T'ENG Chieh (滕傑) and TENG Wen-yi (鄧文儀) suggested the organization of the Li Hsing She (力行社). Because of the need for such an organization in the war against Japan, the Generalissimo accepted

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the suggestion. The Li Hsing She was then organized in Hanking. It consisted of six departments: General Affairs, Organization, Training, Military, Cultural work, and Secret Intelligence. General TAI Li (戴笠) was the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Department. He gathered CHENG Chieh-min (程潜), TANG Chun (唐 444), HSU Liang (徐亮), CH'EN Kung-shu (author of the excuse), and a few others and established firmly the work of his department. TAI expanded his power to such an extent that his department soon stood as an individual organ. Other departments of the Li Hsing She disliked his 'tricky ways' of doing things. The CC Clique disliked him for being so powerful. However, not until Hanking fell to the Japanese and the capital was moved to Wuhan was the Li Hsing She abolished. The Secret Intelligence Department became the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics and the other five departments of the Li Hsing She joined with the forces of the CC Clique and became the San Min Chu I Youth Corps."

2. The overt excuse for the forming of the Corps given this group was that shortly after the Luk'ouchiao incident of 7 July 1937 there was a strong demand on the part of Chinese patriotic youth for the organization, training, and guidance of young Chinese in the war of resistance. In order to meet this demand, a resolution to organize the San Min Chu I Youth Corps was adopted at the Extraordinary National Congress of the Kuomintang in April 1938. The formal inauguration of the Corps took place on 9 July 1938 at Nanchang, Nanchang, "birthplace" of the Chinese Revolution. Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek, Director-General of the Corps, issued a manifesto summoning the youth of the country to rally to the national cause under the banners of the Corps. He gave as the dual purpose of the Corps: (1) resistance to invasion and (2) national reconstruction. Soon youth organizations under the Corps were established in interior and border provinces, municipalities, occupied territories, and overseas.
3. The First National Congress of the Corps was held in March-April 1943 at Chungking. Membership grew to over 880,000 by the end of 1944, and to 1,400,000 by the autumn of 1946.

11. ORGANIZATION

25X1A [redacted] notes: The following discussion and the chart of attachment # 1 are an explanation of the organization of the Corps at its inception and up to the time of the Second Plenary Session of the Corps in which the reorganization (see Part V) took place. Lists of personnel before the reorganization have been previously reported.)

The Director-General

1. The organization of the Corps is pyramidal. At its apex is the Director-General who has complete authority over the Corps. The Corps is CHIANG's own creation; he is the "Leader" with complete authority and members must swear obedience to him. The oath which all members are required to take is as follows: "I hereby pledge with the utmost sincerity to abide by the Three People's Principles, to obey orders of the leader, to observe faithfully the rules of the Corps, to enforce its decisions and to live up to the New Life Movement, both in discharging my duty to the state and in working for the welfare of the people. I will shun no hardship nor dodge any sacrifice required of me. I am willing to take the severest punishment if I violate my oath." During the war the Generalissimo conducted many of the Sunday morning memorial services at the Corps Central Training Camp near Chungking in order that members might have personal contact with him. The members of the Corps are trained to regard CHIANG as their hero.

The Central Headquarters

2. The highest executive organ of the Corps is the Central Headquarters. Under this body are the regional offices, district offices, branch offices, ch'u units, and sub-ch'u units, operating under chiefs appointed by the Director-General. The Central Headquarters is composed of a Secretariat or Council of Secretaries, an Executive Committee, and a Council of Supervisors. The Secretariat enforces the orders of the Director-General, adopts working plans, and organizes and directs

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the branch offices. Nine of the secretaries are on the Executive Committee; one acts as the Secretary-General. Under the Secretariat are the departments of organization, training, publicity, social service, and women's work. The Council of Supervisors or part of a Supervisory Committee acting as a kind of inspecting body, has less power than the Executive Committee or the Secretariat.

Membership

3. Membership, according to the constitution of the Corps, is for Chinese youths of both sexes, ranging from 16 to 25 years of age. Those above 25 years of age may become members of the Kuomintang. Members are forbidden to belong to secret societies; this rule was meant to rid the Corps of corruption and favoritism; when a member of a secret society holds a high position under the government, he inevitably exerts his influence to secure positions for fellow members of his society irrespective of their qualifications. [REDACTED] comment: The rule regarding non-membership in secret societies is not obeyed. Some officials of the Corps are known to be members of secret societies.)

Parallel to Kuomintang

4. Members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang are commonly known as "advisors" to the Youth Corps. They could concurrently hold posts in the Youth Corps. In April 1943 at the joint session of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee of the Youth Corps, the Generalissimo stated that members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Central Supervisory Committee, and the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the five Yuan, would be "ex-officio Directors" of the Corps. ([REDACTED] Note: At this same joint session the Generalissimo himself announced the names of the members of the Committees of the Corps and of the officers of their subordinate organizations.)
5. The organization of the Corps closely resembles that of the Kuomintang itself. In the case of the Youth Corps the authority of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees is derived from the First National Congress of the Youth Corps, while the two Kuomintang boards of the same name derive their authority from the National Kuomintang Congress. "Plenary Sessions" of the Kuomintang are paralleled by "general meetings" (sometimes also called "plenary sessions") of the Youth Corps' Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees. The principal difference between the organization of the Kuomintang and that of the Youth Corps is that the former theoretically derives its authority from the people, while the latter is answerable solely to its leader, Generalissimo CHIANG.
6. Just as the Kuomintang has special Training Camps and Summer Camps so does the Youth Corps (see Part III, Training). In every city where there is a Kuomintang Headquarters there is a San Min Chu I Youth Corps Headquarters. Before the reorganization of September 1946, the head of a Kuomintang Headquarters was concurrently chief of the Youth Corps Headquarters. In the past these chiefs were CC men. With the reorganization, Kuomintang Headquarters Chiefs had to decide whether they wished to remain with the Kuomintang as Headquarters chairmen or stay only with the Youth Corps. Those deciding to stay with the Youth Corps had to break away from the CC Clique to a considerable degree.
7. The National Congress of the Corps is supposed to meet every two years. The first such congress was held in March-April 1943; the second congress was held in August-September 1946.

111. ACTIVITIES AND TRAINING

1. Members of the Youth Corps work in all parts of China and overseas, being especially strong in America. [REDACTED] comment: In January 1942 CHANG Chih-chung, then the Secretary-General, signed a letter addressed to the San Francisco branch authorizing the appointment of certain officers. During the war, branches of the Corps in America received instructions from Chungking on the policy to be adopted in regard to

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Communist activities and on measures to be taken against those who "shirk their duty to China and to the United Nations.")

Warlike Activities

2. During the war about 20 units were organized by overseas Chinese youth throughout the world, working chiefly in the field of propaganda. Social service work includes the operation of youth hostels, youth vocational guidance institutes, and educational advisory committees. During the war more than 20 youth hostels were maintained in various parts of the country, housing youths and students from war areas.
3. The work of the Corps in occupied territories, war areas and behind enemy lines produced gratifying results. The most successful underground work done by the Corps was service rendered by guides helping individuals to escape from occupied territories to free China. Secret stations were set up for this purpose. Individuals asking assistance were carefully investigated, and those found to be spies were detained and reported. Corps members also trained the masses in the war areas and lead them in effecting "scorched earth" tactics. In addition, the members often served as intelligence agents behind enemy lines. (See Part VI, "Blue Shirt Activity")
4. Other activities participated in by the members of the Corps were: the San Min Chu I Cultural Reconstruction Movement, the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement, the Science and Technique for National Defense Movement, the Local Self-Government Movement, the New Life Movement, the Comforting the Army Movement, the Plane Donation Movement, the Refugee and Relief Movement, the Social Relief and Hygiene Movement, and the Educated Youth Joining the Army Movement (which attracted over 100,000 educated youth to enlist in the army voluntarily, breaking the old Chinese traditional conception of looking down upon soldiers.)

Training

5. Members are required to undergo both political and military training. They are also given scientific training and are expected to acquire technical knowledge in order to use their scientific training effectively. There is a Central Training Camp where members receive three months training. During the war this camp was near Chungking. Also at Chungking during the war was the San Min Chu I Preparatory Cadet Training School established by CHIANG Ching-kuo. After the war both the Central Training Camp and this camp closed. In the summer of 1943 the Corps organized a camp at Hanyueh (112-38,27-14) Hunan, to which went the best of the students from schools in the southwest provinces. There the campers were given a six weeks military training course (it is indicative of the importance of the Youth Corps in the eyes of Chinese officials that the camps are frequently visited by high-ranking government officials who contribute generously toward the improvement of the mess. This occurred at the Hanyueh Camp in 1943, and more recently at the Hopen camps in the summer of 1946.) Of the Youth Army, organized in July 1945, "Detachment 202" still exists. By title, CHIANG Ching-kuo was in charge of the political training of the army; actually he was the head. He has been criticized by Corps members for not "laying a firm foundation of the Corps in the Youth Army."
6. One of the original objects of the Corps was to counter Communist and other "unorthodox" or non-Kuomintang ideas among Chinese youth both at home and abroad. YU Chun-chieh (俞俊傑?), Director of the New York branch was officially urged in May 1943 to combat activities of the Overseas Chinese Youth National Salvation Association which was being run by "traitors." At about the same time LIN T'ang (林唐?) was to be sent to America with orders to help fight the influence of Communism on students and other overseas Chinese in the United States. This aim continues to be stressed in training. Recently there has occurred a "purge" of the Corps.
7. Another object for the urgent training of personnel was to carry out the 10 year plan of economic reconstruction referred to in China's Destiny. The same need exists now with the formulation of the "Five Year Plans" announced in January 1947. Generalissimo CHIANG's book, China's Destiny, has become a kind of textbook for the Corps.

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The Corps in the Universities

8. The influence of the Corps in Chinese universities is very great. Because of the ancient anti-foreign imperialism spirit and the strong nationalistic spirit of nearly all Chinese university students, the Youth Corps finds the various campuses ideal incubators for expansion. In all National Universities in China there are specific Youth Corps organizations and officers. In Christian universities there is nothing to prevent the leaders of the Corps being Christians. Some examples of past and current activities of the Corps in various universities are as follows:

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(a) In Chengtu/the Szechuan provincial headquarters of both the Corps and the Kuomintang. [redacted] comment: The headquarters of the Kuomintang and the Youth Corps, both for provinces and the special municipalities, almost always exist in the same city. During the war the Szechuan National University was known as the one with the most Chinese Communist students of all the Chengtu Universities. It was in fact the center of Communist activities among students in Szechuan. In 1943 HUANG Chi-lu (黄季陆) was made President of the university and the students objected, ostensibly because of HUANG's lack of qualifications for the job, but actually because he was a staunch Kuomintang supporter, a member of the CC Clique. Mr. HUANG was said to have been appointed to the Presidency of this university for two purposes: 1) to purge Communists from among the students; and 2) to build up a Youth Corps. He failed in both missions. The students went on strike; troops were called in, and the University was temporarily closed.

(b) At West China Union University the Chinese staff is poorly paid and badly housed, and associates little with the European element. Several members of the foreign staff have for years professed interest in the Communist movement in China and openly encouraged students with Communist sympathies. The Youth Corps is active in this University. The President of the University is "anti-foreign" as are many from among the faculty and students. The Youth Corps has its own spies in every class to report on the activities of the students and the Chinese and foreign members of the staff.

(c) It is said that many students and professors in Chengtu are not very enthusiastic about the Corps, but the Corps provides an excellent ladder for those who seek money and prestige from the Kuomintang.

(d) A missionary who left Shensi Province in 1943 said that the Corps was very strong in Shensi and wielded much authority. If, for instance, a question arose between the local Board of Education and the Youth Corps, the policy was recognized that the ruling of the Corps would be final.

(e) The National Congress of the Corps (in March-April 1943) decided to establish a "Youth University". This was to be an extension of the already existing youth training class at the Central Political Institute (a Kuomintang organization for the training of civil servants). The period of study was fixed tentatively at three years and the students were to undergo training in military, political, economic, and diplomatic affairs. Candidates were to be selected from among qualified members of the Youth Corps in various provinces of China.

9. During the anti-Soviet student demonstrations in Shanghai between 23-26 February 1946 the Youth Corps played an important role. Corps members organized the demonstrations. At Chiao Tung University members of the Youth Corps actually closed the gate and refused to permit students to enter. Students at the university were told to appear in the demonstration at roll-call, and that they would be checked by another roll-call later.

10. LI Shou-yung (李壽雍). President of Chinan University in Shanghai and concurrently publisher of the Hankang Ho Ping Jih Pao (official organ of the Youth Corps), is the leader of student members of the Youth Corps in the Shanghai area. The students are responsible to LI; all other members of the Corps in Shanghai are responsible to WU Shao-shu, head of the Shanghai Youth Corps. LI is not responsible to WU. [redacted] comment: This division of command does not exist in all cities of China. In most cases the Head of the Youth Corps in a municipality is in charge of all of the Youth Corps in that area.) In Shanghai student demonstrations against the Peiping Rape Case, LI instructed student officers of the Corps to try to find out who organized the demonstrations.

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11. In the past six months a so-called "Counter-Balance" program has been followed by the Youth Corps. In the winter of 1946 with the breakdown of the peace negotiations in Hanking and the intensification of the civil war, Chinese Communist and liberal students in the universities of China started a series of demonstrations called the Anti-Civil War Demonstrations (Pan Kei Chan 反内战). The Youth Corps members in the universities then retaliated with the Pan Kei Luan Demonstrations (反内乱). Anti-Civil Disturbance Demonstrations. During the Peiping Rape Case demonstrations in January 1947, Youth Corps members tore down posters and signs put up by the Communist and non-Youth Corps member students. [REDACTED] comment: Most sources agree that Youth Corps members in the various universities are poorly organized and that their leaders are not particularly clever or brilliant people. Communist students and non-Kuomintang students appear to be well organized with very capable leaders who are older than the other students and who study very hard and make good records.)

IV. THE SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CORPS

Convocation of the Second National Congress of the Corps

1. The Second National Congress was opened in Kuling on 1 September and closed on 12 September 1946. Generalissimo CHIANG, the Director-General, presided at both the opening and closing ceremonies. Except for 55 representatives who could not attend because of official business or special leave, the remainder from China and overseas (261 in all) attended the Congress. A presidium was elected among the representatives, which included the following: General CH'EN Ch'eng, Dr. CHU Chia-hua, Major-General CHIANG Ching-kuo, KU Cheng-kang, HO Chung-han, CHENG Yen-fen, LO Chia-lun, SHAO Li-tzu, HU Shu-hua, LO Cho-ying, WU Shao-shu, CHAO Chung-jung, CH'EN Yi-yun, WANG Chih-yuan, HO Yi-chun, PU T'ien-k'ai, YANG Te-chun, HUANG Wei, SUNG Chih-kang, LIU Yi, HSU Chin-yu, CHIANG Cheng-tung, HUAL Cheng, and SHEN Shih-yung. Reports on local, school, overseas, and military youth affairs were made and discussed in the Congress. Local affairs were criticized by Generalissimo CHIANG, as well as by many representatives, for emphasizing too much only the work on the "upper strata" of the community. School, overseas, and military affairs were considered to lack training and effective guidance.

Various Suggestions and Final Decisions on the Status of the Corps

2. At its Congress as well as at the Central Executive Committee meeting on 31 August (one day previous to the opening of the Congress) various suggestions on the status of the Corps were presented. They can be summed up as follows:
- (a) "The Corps should be dissolved and a Youth Department of the Kuomintang should be set up instead." The Ministry of Organization of the Central Kuomintang Headquarters held this opinion, but found itself unable to bring forth a proposal to this effect at the Congress.
 - (b) "The Corps should retain its status quo and should still be placed under the control of the Kuomintang." CH'EN Li-fu, Director of the Central Kuomintang Ministry of Organization, advocated this idea. The Ta Kung Pao, Hanking organ of the CC Clique, printed many articles advocating this same idea.
 - (c) "The Corps should be made an organization of a more independent nature." The cadres of the Kuomintang and those of the Corps should be strictly separated." The cadres of the Central Headquarters of the Corps advocated this idea.
 - (d) "The Corps should be dissolved and an independent political party should be organized. The name of the new party was suggested to be the China Revolutionary Youth Party." The regional and student representatives which formed the majority in the Congress strongly supported this opinion. There has always been considerable friction between the junior members of the Corps and the members of the Kuomintang CEC. The Generalissimo once issued a booklet explaining the proper relationship between the Corps and the party as this friction has been a source of concern to the President.

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3. After some discussion and debate on the question of the status of the Corps, Generalissimo CHIANG declared that the Youth Corps needed a reorganization. However, every member of the Corps is a member of the Kuomintang and a person cannot be a Kuomintang member and at the same time a member of another political party. The Youth Corps, therefore, could only be turned into an independent organization under the Central Government.

Party Politics and Comments on Status of the Corps

1. Since the Youth Corps was under the direction of the Kuomintang Party and CHIANG Kai-fu has such strong power in the party, CHIANG advocated that the Corps should retain its status quo (suggestion (b)) so that he could more or less control the Corps. Important members in the Ministry of Organization of the Kuomintang under the Chief Secretary, LO Hsi-huan (駱季英), serve as a sub-clique in the CC Clique. It was this sub-clique which favored the transformation of the Corps into a Youth Department (suggestion (a)) under the Kuomintang Party so that members of the Ministry of Organization could exercise their influence in the new department. [redacted] comments: Placing the Corps under the Ministry of Education was also advocated. However, the Corps is too large for this ministry. In addition, two of the aspects of the Corps--to educate the youth of the nation and to render social service--have already been taken over to a considerable degree by the Ministries of Education and Social Affairs.)

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5. However, the cadres of the old Central Headquarters of the Corps (composed largely of followers of K'ANG Tse) wished the Corps to be independent (suggestion (c)) which would leave them in power and free from the control of the CC Clique. [redacted] note: K'ANG Tse (康澤), a Lt. General in the Chinese Army, was born in Szechuan in 1906. He graduated from Whampoa Military Academy in 1925 and from the Moscow Sun Yat-sen University in 1927. In 1936 he was the dean of the special training class of the Central Military Academy. In the Li Hsiang-shan (see Part 1) K'ANG was at first a follower of CHIANG Chieh-min and TAI Li; but he slowly gathered his own clique around him. With the organization of the Youth Corps in 1938, K'ANG's men became Central Directors of the Corps and K'ANG himself was the Chief of the Department of Training. Although not a CC Clique man, he worked with the CC Clique as they controlled the Corps. Both K'ANG Tse's men and the CC Clique men disliked the power of TAI Li. By 1945 the followers of K'ANG had become known as the "Old Cadre" of the Corps. In August 1945 he resigned his post and went to America. The reason was that CHIANG Chih-shung, the Secretary-General, was "siding" with CHIANG Ching-kuo, K'ANG's enemy, and CHIANG was not handling the Corps as K'ANG wished. NI Wen-ya, an ardent follower of K'ANG Tse, took his place when K'ANG went abroad. Shortly before the reorganization of the Corps, K'ANG intended to return to China and fight for power in the Corps; however, CHIANG Ching-kuo and CHIANG Ch'eng were able to have the Generalissimo inform K'ANG to remain abroad. NI Wen-ya was relieved of his post and CHIANG Ching-kuo became the Chief of the Department of Organization and Training. The Tung Nan Jih Pao, CC Clique organ, reported on 25 February that, "As the Third Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang will soon be held, preparations are necessary for the solution of the question regarding the relations between the Kuomintang and the Corps and the question of whether the Corps will remain under the control of the Kuomintang; therefore K'ANG Tse has been summoned back to China. He is expected to arrive before the middle of March." General CHIANG Ch'eng possesses more military than political power; therefore, he wished to form a strong political clique to work against the CC Clique. Since his revolutionary spirit wins deep admiration from the young people, the regional and student representatives which formed the majority in the Congress strongly supported his opinion of transforming the Corps into the "China Revolutionary Youth Party." (suggestion (d))

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6. The decision to make the Youth Corps an independent organization rather than a new political party did not mean that the Generalissimo favored K'ANG Tse or K'ANG's men. [redacted] comments: K'ANG Tse, through a CHIANG man, was not called back from America to join the election of the executive members of the Corps; nor were K'ANG's men elected cadres of important posts. The reason for CHIANG's decision was that he saw the Kuomintang's need of some young revolutionary-spirited Chinese to bring forth the kind of reform necessary for the maintenance of the Party's leading role in China. He wanted to see if CHIANG Ch'eng and his own son, CHIANG Ching-kuo, could work out something constructive. However, he did not want to have

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a split in the Party. If the Youth Corps bore the name of a new political party, CHLJG, the Kuomintang Party leader, could not be the leader of this new party at the same time. The members of the Corps would then have to declare themselves non-Kuomintang members in order to be the members of this new party. On the other hand, CHLJG knew he could not remove the conflicts between the Corps and the controlling forces in the Kuomintang Executive Committee (CC Clique leaders chiefly) as long as the Corps was under the Kuomintang. The only compromise possible was to make the Corps independent. [redacted] note: In his speech to the Corps informing the members that the Corps needed a reorganization and that it should be an independent body, the Generalissimo said, "If the Corps is converted into a party, who will be its leader? I cannot be the leader of two political parties at the same time. Besides, where will the money come for its maintenance?"

Various Resolutions Passed

[redacted] note: The complete manifesto issued by the Corps appeared in the Nanking Ho P'ing Jih Pao of 13 September 1946.)

7. Of the several resolutions passed in the Congress the most important are as follows:

(a) The aim of the Corps: to support unification, to carry out democracy, to further education, to improve society, to promote agriculture and industry, to distribute land rights evenly and to unite youth in furthering reconstruction.

(b) The program of the Corps: to promote autonomous local government, to participate in social service, to increase production, to improve the people's livelihood, to reduce illiteracy, to elevate the cultural standard, to strive for mutual help and to develop rural cooperatives.

(c) The intensification of the Corps: to give a general examination on the quality of members of the Corps in order to determine where the weaknesses of the members lie and how to eradicate the weakness; to participate especially in the work of the lower strata in order to achieve the aim as mentioned above and not to become high officials or to get rich; to elevate revolutionary spirit and to sweep up the corrupt and reactionary and anything that may serve as a hindrance to national reconstruction or unification; and to receive guidance from the Kuomintang. (See below Part VII for methods to be used to attain these objectives.)

The Cadre Policy of the Corps

8. The Cadre Policy is based on the followings:

(a) To stress character, ability and revolutionary spirit and zeal in the selection of the cadre and not to count on academic career and work history only.

(b) To interchange the cadres of the Central Headquarters and Branch Headquarters according to a set procedure in order to make all cadres become acquainted with the condition and function of the Corps as a whole.

(c) To have cadres of high responsibility and ability concentrate on the work of the Corps and not to let them share responsibility in the Kuomintang. With the exception of a few whose services are needed badly in both the Corps and in the Kuomintang Central Headquarters no member of the Youth Corps Central Executive Committee can hold a concurrent post on the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

Comment on Resolutions Passed and the Cadre Policy of the Corps

9. The aim and program of the Corps are about the same as they were before the Second Congress except that national reconstruction replaces effort for the war of resistance. [redacted] note: General sources stated the opinion that the future of the

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Corps would mean something worthwhile if the ways of intensifying the Corps could actually be put into practice by the young instead of the old generation of the Kuomintang Party.)

10. The Cadre Policy of "no member of the Youth Corps Central Executive Committee can hold a concurrent post on the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee" dealt a blow to the CC Clique. In essence, it says "CC men step out of important positions in the Youth Corps." CH'EN Li-fu, CH'EN Pu-lei, KU Chen-kang, LIANG Hsiao-ao, CH'ENG Tso-fan and LU T'ieh-cheng, all members of the Kuomintang CEC, were obliged to take their choice of which Executive Committee they wished to belong. CH'EN Ch'ang and CHIANG Ching-kuo were permitted to hold concurrent posts but none of the exceptions were CC men. [redacted] note: In commenting on the reorganization, the Hanking Jen Pao stated, "By excluding the elderly elements from the Corps, vice department chiefs and section chiefs in the headquarters, and the secretaries in the branches all were elevated to positions of influence. Their age is on the average between thirty and forty. It is said that by a peaceful revolution the junior group gains ascendancy")

V. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE CORPS

General Structure of the Corps

1. Under the Director-General there is a Secretary-General with two Deputy Secretaries-General. The Office of the Secretary-General has one secretary and one assistant secretary taking charge of secretarial work, accounting, and other general office affairs. The highest governing body of the Corps under the Director-General is the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of 15 members; the Secretary-General is the Chairman of this committee and the Deputy-Secretaries-General are members of the Committee. Under the CEC are five departments, each with a chief and two deputy chiefs. The names of the departments are: Business and Personnel or the First Department; Organization and Training or Second Department; Publicity and Cultural Work or Third Department; Social Service and Reconstruction or Fourth Department; Guidance, Inspection and Research or the Fifth Department.
2. The Cadres of the Corps are known as the Central Directors. The Board of Central Directors has 72 members, of whom 15 form the Central Executive Committee.
3. The Board of Central Supervisors of the Corps has 49 members, of whom five form the Central Standing Supervisory Committee. [redacted] comment: The Chinese custom of "saving face" and showing respect for the aged finds expression here as in practically all Chinese organizations where a special committee or board is created in order to have a niche into which can be placed those who have prestige through age, experience, wisdom, etc. and are "above" being just ordinary members. The Board of Central Supervisors was created in this case, for these veteran Kuomintang men who cannot be ordinary members. They do little if any actual "supervising." After the reorganization of the Corps, several "young" Corps members were elected to this group.)

Personnel

Director-General

Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek (蔣介石)

Secretary-General

General CH'EN Ch'eng (陳誠)

Deputy Secretaries-General

YUAN Shou-ch'ien (袁守謙)

CH'ENG Yen-fen (鄭彥芬)

Secretary, Office of the Secretary-General

YU Wen-chieh (余文傑)

Assistant Secretary, Office of the Secretary-General

CHIANG Shin-ai (張世愛)

Chief, the 1st Dept.
(Business and Personnel)

CH'EN Ch'ung-lin (陳春霖)

Deputy Chiefs, the 1st Dept.

KUO Chi (郭驥)

CHANG Pao-shu (張寶樹)

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Chief, the 2nd Dept.
(Organization and Training)

Deputy Chiefs, the 2nd Dept.

Chief, the 3rd Dept.
(Publicity and Cultural Work)

Deputy Chiefs, the 3rd Dept.

Chief, the 4th Dept.
(Social Service and Reconstruction)

Deputy Chiefs, the 4th Dept.

Chief, the 5th Dept.
(Guidance, Inspection and Research)

Deputy Chief, the 5th Dept.

Seventy-two Central Directors among whom the first 15 form the Central Executive Committee:

CH'EN Ch'eng

YUAN Shou-ch'ien

CHENG Yen-fen

CHIANG Ching-kuo

CHAO Chung-jung

LI Cheng 李蒸

CHANG Ch'i-yun 張其時

HO Chung-han 賀衷寒

HO Hao-jo 何浩若

HUANG Shao-ku 黃少谷

HUANG Yu-jen 黃宇人

LI Wen-ya 倪文亞

CHENG Ssu-yuan 程思遠

CHIANG Ching-kuo (蔣經國)

LIU Chen (劉真)

YEN Ju (顏如)

LI Chun-lung (李俊龍)

LIU Yeh-shao (劉業昭)

WU Hsi-tse (吳錫澤)

CHAO Chung-jung (趙仲容)

LU Shen (魯參) (LU Chi-shen 魯參)

FENG Shu (馮樹)

HU Kuei (胡軌)

CHENG Tai-en (鄭代恩)

CHENG Tai-sui (鄭代思)

TAI Yi-sh'um (戴軼群)

Generalissimo's man

Generalissimo's man in that he is a loyal CH'EN Ch'eng man; he was in the political department of the National Military Council when CH'EN was the Chief.

Generalissimo and CHIANG Ching-kuo's man; he prefers Ching-kuo to CH'EN Ch'eng, though he is not anti-CH'EN Ch'eng.

Generalissimo's son

Definitely not a CC man; he is divided in his loyalties between CH'EN Ch'eng and CHIANG Ching-kuo.

CHU Chia-hua's man

CHU Chia-hua's man

Generalissimo's man; a "Blueshirt"

HO Yao-tsu's man; a Hunanese

A Hunanese, formerly one of the followers of General FENG Yu-hsiang; now the Generalissimo's man

CC man

K'ANG Tse's man; an old cadre of the Corps

CC man but has stronger connections with the Kwangsi Clique

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HO Lien-k'uei 何聯奎
T'UNG Ju-yen 湯如炎
CHENG T'ung-ho 鄭通和
YU Chi-shih 余濟時
YU Chi-chung 余紀忠
HSIAO Tean-yu 蕭贊育
LIU Yung-yao 劉詠堯
LI Wei-kuo 李惟果
CH'EN Ch'ieh-sheng 陳介生
JEN Chueh-wu 任覺五
HU Shao-shu 吳紹澍
LE Li-hsueh 駱力學
LI Chun-lung 李俊龍
WAN Ch'ang-yen 萬昌言
HU Kuei 胡軌
YANG Yu-ch'ing 楊玉清
HEU Hui-chih 徐含之
CH'EN Hsueh-p'ing 陳雪屏
T'EN P'ei-lin 田培林
CHU Ko-chen 竺可楨
LI Shou-yung 李壽雍
HU Lu-lan 胡水蘭

(The following members of the Board of Central Directors were regarded by all sources as being "of such small importance that if they do have definite clique loyalties it would not be significant.")

LI Kuo-chun 李國俊
T'U Kung-sui 涂公遂
HUANG Chen-wu 黃珍吾

Now one of CH'EN Ch'eng's men

Unknown clique loyalties, but probably one of CH'EN Ch'eng's men.

CC man; used to be dean of the Shanghai middle school.

Whampoa Clique

Whampoa Clique

CC man

K'ANG Tse's man and Whampoa connections and leanings; a former Blue Shirt

Generalissimo's man

CC man

A "Chinese Trotskyite"; now one of the followers of HU Tsung-nan, personal supporter of the late TAI LI

Old cadre of the Corps; formerly he was definitely a CC man.

CC man

CH'EN Ch'eng's man

CC man

Second in favor with CHIAO Ching-kuo, CHENG Yen-fen being first.

Old cadre of the Corps

CC man

CC man

CHU Chia-hua's man

CHU Chia-hua's man

Divided loyalties between both CHU Chia-hua and CHU Chia-hua

Daughter of General HU Tsung-nan

WANG Huang-pin 王煥彬

TS'ING Yuan-chun 戚元駿

YUAN Yung-fu 袁永馥

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CHAI Ch'un-chien 詹純鑑
 CHAO Chao-t'ang 吳兆棠
 CHOU Yun-chi 寇永吉
 CHU T'ien-hsing 季天行
 LI T'ien-min 李天民
 CHUNG Chung-liang 張忠良
 YU Cheng 余極
 CHOU T'ien-hsien 周天賢
 TAI Chung-yu 戴仲玉
 CHUNG Tso-mou 張作謀
 LI Yu-pang 李友邦
 YANG Erh-ying 楊爾瑛
 HU Hsi-fan 胡維藩
 HU Ch'un-ch'ing 吳春晴
 CHOU Han 周南
 KUO Ch'eng 郭澄

SHEN Tsu-wei 沈祖懋
 CHIH Chih-t'ang 韋贊唐
 WANG Ming-hua 王寧華
 TAI Tun-ching 馬敦靜
 AI SHIA* 艾沙
 JEN Kuo-jung 任國強
 SHANG-KUAN Yeh-yu 上官義佐
 T'ANG Te-p'u 唐德普
 WU Jun-shan 黃潤珊
 CH'EN Lieh-fu 陳烈甫
 T'AN Yi-chih 譚翼之
 HSI Kuang-lu 許光祿
 KUO Kuang-lu? 吳菊芳
 KU Chu-fang 許素玉
 HSU Su-yu 徐瘦秋
 HSU Shou-ch'iu 徐瘦秋

Forty-nine Central Supervisors among whom the first five form the Central Standing Supervisory Committee:

T'AN P'ing-shan 譚平山
 CHU Ching-nung 朱經農
 CHU Kuang-chien 朱光潛
 LI Han-kuei 李曼瑰
 LIU Chien-ch'un 劉健群

LI Hsien-chou 李仙洲
 HU Han-hsuan 吳南軒
 HU Shu-hua 胡庶華
 LO Chia-lun 羅家倫
 MAO Shih-chang 廖世承
 KU Cheng-ting 谷正鼎

(See comment above re loyalties of men of small importance which also applies to the following.)

SHEN Chih-yi 宋志伊
 LIU Tsan-shou 劉贊周
 *Sinkiang delegate

Generalissimo's man

CHU Chia-hua's man

Professor and scholar; CC connections

Not definitely known; probably CH'EN Ch'eng's man

Old scholar; Blue Shirt; he was the man who suggested that that terrorist organization be called the Blue Shirts; he was formerly HO Ying-ch'ing's secretary.

CC man

CC man

CC man, connections with CHU Chia-hua

Generalissimo's man with CC connections

Scholar affiliated with CHU Chia-hua

Affiliated with CHU Chia-hua

CH'EN Tsung-ying 陳宗瑩

KUAN Tse-liang 管澤良

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FU Kuang-hai	傅光海	PANG Shu-hsuan	方舒軒
HUANG Lien-shan	黃文山	LIANG Chen	梁炎
YU Hsi-chiu	顧錫九	LO Hsiang-lin	羅香林
SIANG P'ao	宋恪	CH'EN YI	陳頤
YEN Hsi	閻偉	Kuo Jo-en	甘若愚
PAI Yu	白俞	CHU Wen	朱雯
CHANG Ping	張明	LO Tee-k'ai	羅澤園
CHANG Yuan-liang	張元良	HU Su	胡素
CH'EN Ts'ang-cheng	陳蒼正	TUNG Hsui-cheng	童懷政
HUNG Kuei	洪軌	HUANG P'ei-lan	黃佩蘭
WANG Yuan-hui	王元輝	WU T'ien-sun	伍天孫
LIU Kung-wu	劉公武	LI Ping-jui	李炳瑞
TSO To	左鐸	LI Shih-chun	李世準
CHENG Chao-tsan	孟昭贊	LI Ho	李荷
LU Shu-ching	盧孰競	T'AO Jung	陶鏞
HUANG Pei-hsin	黃悖心	One name missing	
CHANG Lin-chuan	張民權		
A-HA-TZU *	阿哈孜		

*Sinkiang delegate

Comment Concerning The Election of Personnel

4. The Secretary of the Office of the Secretary-General, YU Wen-chieh, is a CH'EN Ch'eng men. Among the five departments, the Chief of the First Department, CH'EN Ch'un-lin is a CHU Chia-hua man; the Chief of the Second Department, CHANG Ching-kuo is the second man of the Corps. The Chief of the Third Department, LI Chun-ling, is a CH'EN Ch'eng man; the Chief of the Fifth Department is HU Kuei who is CHUANG Ching-kuo's second favorite. CHAO Chung-jung, the Chief of the Fourth Department is definitely not a CC man.
5. The staffs of the five departments hold the real power in the Corps; of these the Second Department is the most important and most powerful. In the reorganization, the CC Clique has lost power. In the Central Executive Committee of the Corps, HUANG Yu-jen is a CC man but he is of minor importance in the CC Clique as well as in the Corps itself. Nine other CC men, including two with CC connections, are among the Central Directors and the Central Supervisors; however, none of the CC Clique are among the leading members of the staff of the five departments.
6. The Generalissimo appears to have been successful in forming a clique composed of followers of CH'EN Ch'eng, CHANG Ching-kuo and CHU Chia-hua to combat the CC Clique, at least as far as influence in the Corps is concerned. CHU Chia-hua, now an enemy of the CC Clique, found his own clique too small to face the CC and so joined with CH'EN Ch'eng. There are more CHU Chia-hua men among the leading personnel of the Corps than there are CC men.
7. The large number of "unimportant" members among the Central Directors and Central Supervisors are unknown young men between 30 and 40 years of age.

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8. It is clear that CH'EN Ch'eng and CHIANG Ching-kuo are playing the leading role in the Corps. (Actually CHIANG Ching-kuo is now the most important and powerful man in the Corps.) CH'EN Ch'eng as Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army will have to devote most of his attention to that task. CHIANG Ching-kuo's work is Kiang'ai and his school for training of cadres of the Corps has considerable respect from the young men of the Corps. However, so long as the Nationalist Party is alive, there is little prospect that the Corps will become an open political party in opposition to the Kuomintang.

Personnel Changes Caused by Decision Against Concurrent Positions

9. Because of the decision that members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Central Supervisory Committee could not hold posts concurrently in the Youth Corps (with eight exceptions, see below), the following Kuomintang members of the two committees mentioned "voluntarily declared that they would give up their right of being elected to positions in the Youth Corps" and, hence, would hold positions in the Kuomintang in preference to the Youth Corps:

CHANG Chih-chung	張治中	CH'EN Yi-yun	陳逸雲
CH'EN Li-fu	陳立夫	JEN Cho-hsuan	任卓宣
CHU Chia-hua	朱家驊	TENG Pei-huang	鄧飛黃
CH'EN Lu-lei	陳布雷	CHANG Po-chin	張伯瑾
HU Tsung-nan	胡宗南	LIN Yi-chung	林翼中
KU Cheng-kang	谷正綱	LIU Ko-shu	柳克述
LANI Tung-yuan	王東原	WANG Shih-chieh	王世杰
T'ANG En-po	湯恩伯	HU Shu-hua	胡恩華
K'ANG Tse	康澤	SHAO Li-tzu	邵力子
TUAN Hsi-p'eng	段錫朋	KU T'ieh-ch'eng	吳鐵城
CHANG Li-sheng	張厲生	LO Chia-lun	羅家倫
TENG Wen-yi	鄧文儀	HSUEH Yueh	薛岳
LIANG Han-ts'ao	梁寒操	LI Han-hun	李漢魂
CHANG Tao-fan	張道藩	LONG Jen-hao	翁文灝
LI Shu-sen	李樹森	KUAN Ling-chen	關麟徵
NI Wen-yu	倪文宙	SUNG Hsi-lien	宋希濂
KU Hsi-p'ing	顧希平	KU Cheng-ting	谷正鼎
HUANG Yu-jen	黃宇人	PU Tsou-yi	傅作義
LIU Chien-ch'un	劉健群	MEI Yi-ch'ei	梅贻琦
FAN Yu-sui	范予遂	KAN Nai-kuang	甘乃光
HUNG Chi-lu	黃季陸	LI Mo-an	李默庵
YU Ching-t'ang	余井塘	LI Shih-chen	李士珍
HSIUNG Ting-jung	項定榮	LI Yen-nien	李延年
WANG Ch'ei-chiang	王啟江	WANG Hsing-chou	王星舟
HUANG Hsueh-ch'u	黃學初	CHOU Chih-jou	周至柔

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10. The eight exceptions of Kuomintang members who could hold concurrent posts in the Youth Corps are:

CHIANG Ch'eng
 CHIANG Ching-kuo
 HUANG Yu-jen (Member C.E.C.)
 LI Chia-lun (Member C.E.C.)
 K'ien-ya (Reserve Member C.E.C.)
 LIU Chien-ch'un (Member C.E.C.)
 HU Shu-hua (Member C.S.C.)
 KU Cheng-ting (Member C.E.C.)

11. Members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Central Supervisory Committee who "voluntarily declared that they would give up their posts" as the head of various Kuomintang Headquarters are:

LIU Shao-shu
 CHAO Chung-jung
 HO Hsiao-jo
 and few others

VI. "BLUE SHIRT" ACTIVITY

1. Comparatively little emphasis is now placed on Blue Shirt activity in the Corps. When K'ANG Tse, an old-time Blue Shirt, was the head of the Department of Organization and Training, there was considerable emphasis on Blue Shirt activity by Corps members. The only influential Blue Shirt members still holding positions in the Corps are LIU Chien-ch'un, HO Chung-han, and LIU Yung-yao with HO Hsiao-jo and JEN Chuoh-wu possible sympathizers. HU Wen-ya and LIU Yung-yao are the only K'ANG Tse men holding positions of any importance in the Corps. With the reorganization, K'ANG Tse is out of the Corps. CHIANG Ching-kuo, who is not an exponent of Blue Shirt tactics, now holds the powerful post of Chief of the Department of Organization and Training; and CHIANG's favorite, HU Kuei, is the Chief of the Department of Inspection, Guidance and Research. This department is supposed to take care of all statistics, records, and problems of members of the Corps. Any intelligence work done by the Corps is directed by this department. While in the past and particularly during the war some espionage and terrorist activity was done by members of the Corps, the Whampoa Clique prefers to have this type of work done by others. With the CC Clique out of the Corps for the most part and with the lessening of stress placed on intelligence activity by Youth Corps members, the CC Clique loses one of its best channels of information.
2. The above does not mean that the Youth Corps will not do any espionage work at all. Members of the Corps in all cities of China cooperate with local garrison headquarters as these are also Whampoa Clique controlled. In the recent "Americans Get Out of China" demonstrations, Youth Corps members in Shanghai, Peiping and Tientsin gave information to garrison headquarters investigators regarding instigators, organizers and participants in the demonstrations.

VII. "GENERAL EXAMINATION" OR "PURGE" (see Part IV, para. 7)

1. From 15 February 1947 to 15 March 1947 the General Examination or Corps Purge will take place. Those regions quite distant from Nanking will be permitted to report later than the 15th of March. With the approval of the Director-General, the following Central Directors and Supervisors of the Corps are serving as regional chairmen whose responsibility is to take care of the purge in their respective regions:

CHIANG Ching-kuo (Nanking, Kiangsu and Chekiang)
 HSIAO Tsan-yu (Anhwei)
 CHENG Yen-fen (Kwangtung, Hongkong and Hacao)
 CH'ENG Szu-yuan (Kwangsi)
 PAI Yu (Hunan, Hupeh, and Hankow)

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- 13 U Chien-ch'un (Kweichow)
- 14 Ju-yen (Yunnan)
- 15 Wei-kuo (Chungking, Szechuan and Sikang)
- 16 Wen-yu (Kiangsi and Fukien)
- 17 Yang-yao (Kansu, Ninghsia and Ch'inghai)
- 18 Yu Kung-sui (Shensi and Honan)
- 19 Chih-yi (Shantung)
- 20 Chung-jung (Suiyuan and Shansi)
- 21 Chun-lung (Hopei, Peiping and Tientsin)


2. The reason made public for the general examination is that the Corps is desirous of finding members lost during the war. Those members who did underground work and traveled to other parts of China during the war should be located and allowed to register with a local office of the Corps. The temporary regulations of the Corps for the general examination state that "quality rather than quantity will be emphasized in the examination." Actually all Corps members must report to a local office (sub-ch'u, Ch'u or branch office) and be registered. This involves proving that each individual is a bona fide member of the Corps. Each one must give his name, date of birth, swear obedience to the Corps and take the oath; give proof of not having collaborated with the Japanese; and make clear his political inclination. This is the main reason for the examination. All members must be pro-Kuomintang. All Communist sympathizers will be purged from the Corps. Though the ~~Whangpo Clique now controlling the Corps~~ and the CC Clique are political enemies within the Kuomintang, they are alike in their hatred for the Chinese Communists. As soon as each local unit has all the members in its district "properly registered", the regional chairmen will investigate the records and report to Nanking headquarters that the examination is completed.

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ATTACHMENT #1:

STRUCTURE OF YOUTH CORPS PRIOR TO REORGANIZATION SEPT. 1966



* In the reorganization, both the Central Headquarters and the Council of Secretaries were abolished.

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
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ATTACHMENT # 2:

STRUCTURE OF THE YOUTH CORPS FOLLOWING REORGANIZATION SEPT. 1954



* Secretary-General is the Chairman of the Executive Committee.

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